Lunch seminar with Philippe Choné

Research seminar Chair Research

,   -
Salle C 108 (1er étage), Université Paris-Dauphine

Speaker

Philippe Choné

 Partial exclusivity (with Laurent Linnemer and Thibaud Vergé)

We investigate the anticompetitive effects of pre-auction negotiations in selling and procurement situations. Assuming (in the selling case) that the seller and an “incumbent” buyer can move before valuations are learnt, we show that they have a joint incentive to arrange for themselves the option of entering into exclusive negotiations after uncertainty is resolved. In equilibrium, an auction takes place with an endogenous probability that depends on the bargaining process. In that auction, the beliefs are asymmetric even when the potential buyers are ex ante symmetric.

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