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 | Espace One, Université Paris-Dauphine |
The reputation of regulated companies can be the target of an explicit strategy on the part of sector regulators, which is crucial to their relationship with their customers/users, but also to the support they can receive from the public and hence from the public authorities. Under the increasing control of the courts, they can disseminate information or issue recommendations likely to guide the actions of operators because of the potential damage of negative signals (such as the exposure of bad practices or mediocre performance) or, on the contrary, the benefits of positive signals.
While the practices of "sunshine regulation" and "name and shame" do not have the immediate effects of sanctions or approvals decided by the regulator, it is nonetheless expected that the dissemination of information on operators' actual performance or indicators enabling quality/price comparisons of their services (and incorporating other performance criteria where appropriate: environmental, social, etc.) will have an incentive effect. Nonetheless, many questions remain.
First of all, in terms of principles, are we really sure that regulators are capable of influencing the behaviour of users or political decision-makers by sending out signals? Do the latter actually react to information from the regulator? Do operators not in return have the means and vectors of communication to enable them to counter any reputational offensives from the regulators?
Secondly, in terms of legitimacy, the regulator has a mandate to make the market work better. Ensuring greater market transparency can be seen as a legitimate way of doing this. That being said, the regulator does not generally have an explicit mandate from the legislator giving it the authority and the necessary means to guarantee this transparency. Reputational strategies are even more closely linked to the regulators' desire to make their action more effective given the limits of the resources allocated to them.
Finally, on a practical level, ensuring greater transparency of information means implementing mechanisms for collecting data (from operators, users and third parties such as local authorities), processing it and making it available to the public and decision-makers in a form that is likely to trigger concrete action on their part. This requires considerable know-how and resources, which the regulator does not always have.
We will therefore look at the various methods available to regulators for influencing operators through reputational incentives, their effectiveness, their limits and the constraints on their implementation. The legal framework within which these actions can be deployed will also be investigated. Finally, the prospects for these methods in terms of the effectiveness of the regulator's action will be discussed.
Speakers
- Claudie BOITEAU | Professeure de droit public, Université Paris Dauphine
- Anna BUTLEN | Directrice des Affaires Juridiques, HADOPI
- James DRUMMOND | Policy Analyst au sein de la Regulatory Policy Division, OCDE
- Pierre DUBREUIL | Adjoint au chef de l'Unité "Régulation par la donnée", ARCEP
- Nicolas WAGNER | Directeur du Transport routier de voyageurs et des autoroutes, ARAFER
This seminar is reserved for members of the Club des Régulateurs
