|Espace One (1er étage), Université Paris-Dauphine|
"Political Contestability and Contract Rigidity: An Analysis of Procurement Contracts"
Following Spiller (2008) we argue that public contracts differ from private ones because they are more permeable to political environment. Using algorithmic data reading and textual analysis on a rich dataset of contracts, we show that, because of this permeability, public contracts are more rigid and consequently more frequently renegotiated than private ones. This gives rise to important managerial implications.
"Cheap talk, monitoring and collusion"
A number of collusive agreements involve the exchange of self-reported sales data between firms, which use them to monitor compliance with a target market share allocation. Such communication between competitors may facilitate collusion even if it is unverifiable cheap talk and the underlying information becomes publicly available with a delay. The exchange of sales information may allow firms to implement incentive-compatible market share reallocation mechanisms after unexpected swings, limiting the recourse to price wars as a tool for mutual disciplining. Such communication may allow firms to earn profits that could not be earned in any collusive equilibrium without communication.