Championing and Shaming Strategies in a Confused Market: Which One to Use?

La Chaire Recherche

image
Auteur(s) Alexandre Volle
Patrick González
Type de publication Working paper

We analyze the performance of the championing and shaming information collecting strategies in a credence good market. Championing (Shaming) means certifying (uncovering) firms that sell high (low) quality products. A benevolent NGO investigates a firm to inform the consumer. It must decide between these strategies that have roughly the same chance of success. This is a choice of experiment problem in the context of a market hampered by asymmetric information. Both strategies performs differently because they provide a different information about players that behave differently. A champion welcomes certification while a fraudster fears shaming.
We show that their relative performances depend on the kind of equilibrium played. In a sophisticated market where information is revealed through price separation, the championing strategy fares better than the shaming strategy while the reverse is true when the information technology is poor and the consumers expect a pooling price.

Nos communautés


  • Dauphine 300.png
  • Fondation 300.png
  • IOEA_LOGO_COMPLETE_0.png
  • SIOE_logo_RGB_0.png
  • oecd_logo_0.png

Nos partenaires


Les entreprises

  • ASFA_Log_CRVB_0.png
  • Ecologic-logo-rvb.png
  • logo_GROUPE_ADP_cmjn_0.png
  • RATP couleur grise.jpg
  • RTE_logo+signD_CMJN_CS4 - Copie_0.png
  • Le+logotype_0_0.png

 

Les institutions publiques

  • logo_conseil_2009_fr_gris_0.png
  • Logo_CGE-01_0_0.png
  • Cour des Comptes_0_0.png

 

Les experts

 

Les membres du Club des régulateurs

  • ACPR
  • ANJ
  • ANSSI
  • ARCEP new-court_2.png
  • logo_ART_cmjn.png
  • Logo DGAC_quadri_0.png